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The Uncertain Application of the Right
of Privacy in Personal Medical Decisions:
The Laetrile Cases
But when intemperance and cases of illness increase in a state, are not both courts
of justice and houses of medicine often being opened, and are not the arts of both
lawyer and doctor held in high import... ?-PlatoI
In the fifteen years since the right of privacy was given its modem
enunciation2 by the United States Supreme Court, its scope has been defined
to include such medically related decisions as procreation,3 abortion of a
fetus,4 and contraception.5 The Court, however, has so far declined to decide
whether the right of privacy is a fundamental one in the context of an ill
person's right to make an informed choice among various medical treatment
options. The unsettled application of a medical right to privacy is well
illustrated by the conflicting decisions of state and federal courts faced with
cancer patients' demands for the federally proscribed drug Laetrile. This
Comment will briefly survey the history of Laetrile and the Laetrile cases that
have addressed the right of privacy argument, and will then discuss the right
of privacy doctrine in the constitutional context of the federal government's
approach to cancer.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Right of Privacy
The specific constitutional right to privacy was born in the 1965 case of
Griswold v. Connecticut,6 in which the Court found the right to be funda-
mental though not set out in the Constitution.7 Justice Douglas' opinion found
various guarantees in the Bill of Rights within whose "penumbras" were
created zones of privacy.8 Among these guarantees were the right of associa-
tion in the penumbra of the first amendment, the third amendment's prohibi-
tion against peacetime quartering of soldiers, the fourth amendment's prohibi-
tion of unreasonable searches and seizures, the fifth amendment's self-
1. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 405 (J. Adam ed. 1938) (K. Christensen translation, after Jowett).
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
7. Id. at 482, 485.
8. Id. at 484.
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incrimination clause, and the ninth amendment's reservation of rights not
specifically mentioned anywhere in the Constitution. 9
In Griswold, the right of privacy was held to include a married couple's
right to practice contraception.'0 As a fundamental right, it invoked the
Court's strict scrutiny" of the relevant state statutes that forbade the use of
contraceptives. Griswold's protection was extended to an unmarried person's
right to contraceptives in the 1972 case of Eisenstadt v. Baird. 
2
In the 1973 Abortion Cases, 13 the Court found that a woman's decision to
abort a fetus was protected by the constitutional right of privacy. 14 The Court
held, however, that the right is not absolute and can be countered by a
sufficiently compelling state interest. 5 In brief, the Court found that as a fetus
matures the state's interest in protecting the health of the mother increases,
eventually to the point of overcoming the woman's right of privacy. 16 The
1976 abortion case of Planned Parenthood v. Danforth17 saw another com-
parison of state interests with the right of privacy. Where the state regulated
without prohibiting, the Court was willing to uphold the statute; 8 where it
gave someone other than the pregnant woman veto power over the abortion, 9
or effectively denied the most widely practiced and safest of the abortion
medical procedures,20 the Court struck down the statute.
Regulation, as distinct from prohibition, was the key to the 1977 Whalen
v. Roe 2' decision, where a New York statute required extensive record-keep-
ing of the names of lawful users of certain narcotic drugs. The plaintiffs
attempted to invoke the developing right of privacy in opposition to the law, 2
but the Court held that the risks of unauthorized disclosure of confidential
information-speculative as they were-did not outweigh the state's interest
in regulating dangerous drugs.Y The crucial factor was that no "individual has
been deprived of the right to decide independently, with the advice of his
physician, to acquire and to use needed medication." 24 In this paragraph,
which was to be subject to diametrically opposite interpretations by lower
courts and commentators,25 the Court went on to state that "[a]lthough the
State no doubt could prohibit entirely the use of particular Schedule II drugs,
9. Id. Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion stressed the ninth amendment. Id. at 487.
10. Id. at 485-86.
11. Id. at 485. See text accompanying notes 33-35 infra.
12. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
14. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973),
15. Id. at 154-55.
16. Id. at 156, 162-63.
17. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
18. Id. at 65-67, 79-81.
19. Id. at 67-75.
20. Id. at 75-79.
21. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
22. Id. at 598, 599.
23. Id. at 600, 601.
24. Id. at 603.
25. See text accompanying notes 179-83,infra.
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it has not done so. This case is therefore unlike those in which the Court held
that a total prohibition of certain conduct was an impermissible deprivation of
liberty." 26 The Court included a footnote in this statement which read: "It is,
of course, well settled that the State has broad police powers in regulating the
administration of drugs by the health professions." 27 As will be seen, 28 some
courts have taken the first sentence out of context so that standing alone it
appears to allow the state absolute power to prohibit certain dangerous drugs.
The next sentence, however, at least implies that a total prohibition is an
impermissible deprivation of liberty.
Since the right of privacy is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution,
29
and since it has been found under the "penumbras" of the first, third, fourth,
fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments, among others, a0 it is not surprising
that there is confusion about the extent of the right and the level of review to
be invoked once the right is found.3 ' The level of review under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is fairly standardized in the
Court's decisions.32 If the Court finds that the state legislation under review
"'operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges on a funda-
mental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution,' , 3  the
Court will apply strict scrutiny of the statute. "'If not, the [legislative]
scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers
some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute
an invidious discrimination.' 3 4 Since a statute rarely survives strict scrutiny
and rarely fails the rational basis test,35 this two-step analysis has been criti-
cized as being actually a single-step approach, with the outcome decided at
the threshold.36
Thus, it is not surprising that the Court, in fashioning the evolving right of
privacy, has striven to retain some flexibility by treating it as less than abso-
lute. 7 Unlike most fundamental rights, the right of privacy has had to give
way before the "compelling state interest ' 38 that seems so hard to find when
other fundamental rights have been reviewed. Courts and commentators have
26. 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977) (footnote omitted).
27. Id. at 603 n.30.
28. See text accompanying notes 180-83 infra.
29. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
30. Id. at 481, 484, 487; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
31. See Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1979).
32. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416,523-25 (1978).
33. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,470 (1977), quoting San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. i, 17 (1973).
34. Id. (bracketed material added by the Court in Maher).
35. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524-25 (1978).
36. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protec-
tion Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071 (1974). See Massa-
chusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 318-21 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
37. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
38. See text accompanying notes 16-20 supra.
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read this apparent middle ground variously. In People v. Privitera,39 the
California Supreme Court chose to read Roe v. Wade as applying a rational
basis test to the right of privacy-abortion right, at least when a danger to
health exists.40 On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist read Wade and its
companion case Doe v. Bolton as requiring close scrutiny, 41 and Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Wade terms the test "'particularly careful
scrutiny.' , 42 As one author has put it: "The compelling interest test [of Roe
v. Wade] is not the same 'compelling state interest test' which is employed in
suspect classification/equal protection analysis .... . 4. Another author finds
a "rational basis-compelling interest" approach 4 to privacy in the Court's
opinion in Carey v. Population Services International,45 whereas Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in that case interpreted the test used as being the
"strictest standard of judicial review." 46 While it is a truism that the privacy
cases decided by the Court are confusing,47 the pattern seems to be that the
Court has left the rigid bounds of the strict scrutiny or rational basis dichot-
omy and is now willing to look for compelling state interests as possibly
countervailing any fundamental right of privacy it may have found.
B. Right to Die by Refusing Treatment
There is no Supreme Court ruling on whether an individual has a consti-
tutional right to reject life-saving medical treatment.48 The leading state case is
the well-publicized In re Quinlan,49 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that the developing right of privacy was presumably "broad enough to
encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain
circumstances . . . .50 The court decided Quinlan on state constitutional
grounds.5' The "certain circumstances" do not include the right of an acci-
dent victim to reject life-saving medical treatment;52 rather, a victim of a
major, permanently crippling disease has the right to decline life-prolonging
treatment.53 The narrowness of the Quinlan ruling may result from the com-
39. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
40. Id. at 703, 591 P.2d at 922, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173-74 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,223
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 170 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring).
43. Jackson, The Coerced Use of Ritalin for Behavior Control in Public Schools: Legal Challenges, 10
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 181, 189 (1976).
44. Ehrlich, Freedom of Choice: Personal Autonomy and the Right to Privacy, 14 IDAHO L. REV. 447,466
(1978).
45. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
46. Id. at 703 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Arguably, a third, middle level of review-a substantial
relationship test--can be posited from the majority opinion. Id. at 691.
47. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (1979).
48. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Supp. at 74 (1978).
49. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
50. Id at 40, 356 A.2d at 663.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 35, 39, 355 A.2d at 661, 663.
53. Unlike the case of a young woman whose life depended on surgery and blood transfusion but who,
being unconscious, was unable to give informed consent, John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 NJ.
576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971), Karen Quinlan's case was "diametrically opposite [in that she could only] vegetate a
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plications of Karen Quinlan's incompetence to represent herself;54 to give the
relief sought (disconnection from life maintenance systems)55 the court first
had to give Quinlan's father the right to make the decision in his daughter's
name.56 In any event, the court summed up its privacy considerations with a
balancing test when it wrote that "the State's interest contra weakens and the
individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
and prognosis dims."-
57
More recently, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the right of a com-
petent, adult patient, under the privacy doctrine, to refuse life-prolonging
treatment.58 A federal district court has found that the right of mental patients
to refuse treatment in nonemergency situations "is best founded on the
emerging right of privacy," 5 9 although it cautioned, as the United States
Supreme Court did in Roe v. Wade,60 that the right is not absolute.61 Simi-
larly, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a mental patient,
through his guardian, could reject the painful proffered treatment for his
cancer.62 The decision was based on the right of privacy. 63 The court reiter-
ated this reasoning under the privacy doctrine in Marcoux v. Attorney
General,64 where it said that the individual's choice to accept or decline
medical treatment is normally beyond veto by the state.65
Contrary holdings have almost invariably appeared in emergency situa-
tions in which an injured person is seeking to reject, typically for religious
reasons, treatment that is clearly life-saving and not inordinately painful, such
as a blood transfusion. 66
C. The Laetrile Climate
The increasing death rates for many kinds of cancer in this century, 67
together with the fear of the pain associated with many forms of the disease,
would inevitably have kept the disease prominent in the public mind. 68 The
few measurable months with no realistic possibility of returning to any semblance'of cognitive or sapient life."
70 N.J. 10, 39, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976).
54. Karen Quinlan was comatose, and in a chronic and persistent "vegetative" state. Id. at 25, 355 A.2d at
655.
55. 70 N.J. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 (emphasis in original).
58. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980), aff'g 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. App. 1978).
59. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978).
60. 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
61. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1145 (D.N.J. 1978).
62. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
63. Id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424.
64. 375 Mass 63, 375 N.E.2d 688 (1978).
65. Id. at 66, 375 N.E.2d at 690.
66. E.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 39, 355 A.2d. 647, 633 (1976). See, e.g. Application of the President and
Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964)(emergency victim given
life-saving blood transfusions against religiously motivated refusal by victim and her husband); Raleigh Fitkin-
Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964) (similar
situation involving pregnant woman).
67. R. RIGDON, TRAUMA AND CANCER 12-13, 16 (1975).
68. R. RETrIG, CANCER CRUSADE 2 (1977).
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campaign that accompanied the effort which eventually led to the National
Cancer Act of 1971 may have not only inflamed those fears, but encouraged
undue hopes for medicine's ability to find a cure.69 One author calls the
campaigners' language that of "exaggeration [and] hyperbole," 70 and implies
that they were engaging in a "polite deception" 71 of Congress and the public
about the prospects for advances against cancer. Recent claims by the Presi-
dent's Cancer Panel established by the National Cancer Act have been "more
modest and subdued": 72 "'We are, in truth, profoundly ignorant about the
real nature of cancer. We do not really understand what happens."' 73
In spite of the massive amounts of federal money infused into the cancer
research program, some scientists claim that there has been no improvement
in the five-year survival rate of cancer victims since the 1950s. 74 Even if one
assumes that there have been significant advances against cancer in general
(and there are apparently uncontroverted findings of progress against a few
specific kinds of cancers75), the price has been high to the patients faced with
the rigors of surgery, radiation and, most notably, chemotherapy. As one
patient put it, chemotherapy is "'a fate worse than death."' 76 Cancer
researchers themselves acknowledge the severe side effects of chemotherapy
that induce patients to drop out of the treatment programs and deter still
others from starting chemotherapy. 77
Quack cancer "cures" have been foisted on a willing public for
decades. 78 Government-approved treatments are still disappointing in their
efficacy 79 and painful in their side effects.80 Approved treatments are all the
more frustrating and disappointing for cancer victims today who have been
expecting dramatic breakthrough from the cancer "crusade" kicked off by
69. Id. at 317-18.
70. Id. at 318.
71. Id. at 320.
72. Id. at 319.
73. Id., quoting PRESIDENT'S CANCER PANEL: 1977 REPORT.
74. Id. at 321. The Five-Year Survival Rate measures the number of patients who are still living five years
after the date of diagnosis. It does not measure the cure rate. Even taking the 1975 survey of survival rates at
face value, see Cutler, Myers & Green, Trends in Survival Rates of Patients with Cancer, 293 NEW ENGLAND
J. MED. 122 (1975), the claim is less than a ten percent improvement in 97 percent of cancers since 1950. Critics
have pointed out that even this modest claim can be accounted for purely via earlier diagnosis; for example,
diagnosing a cancer six months earlier than usual will automatically effect a ten percent improvement in the
Five-Year Survival Rate. See Garvin, Survival Rates Calculated from Date of Diagnosis, 293 NEW ENGLAND
J. MED. 1045 (1975).
75. R. RET1IG, CANCER CRUSADE 5, 7-8 (1977).
76. U.S., April 3, 1979, at 19. A Maryland jury has awarded $800,000 to a woman for her pain and suffering
in undergoing chemotherapy as a result of a mistaken diagnosis of cancer. The plaintiff is trying to decide
whether to accept the judge's remittitur of $400,000 or a new trial. Washington Post, Feb. 8, 1980, § B, at I, col.
I.
77. "[T]he treatment of cancer with certain drugs induces severe side effects in many people [who] either
discontinue or limit the amount of drug that we give them because of the ... side effects." Letter from N.
Larrimer, M.D., to State Senator Stano (July 26, 1979).
78. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,795-96 (1977).
79. See text accompanying notes 73-74 supra.
80. See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra. "A real need to obtain relief from the upsetting cancer
chemotherapy treatment exists." Cohen, Marijuana: Does It Have a Possible Therapeutic Use?, 240 J.A.M.A.
1761, 1763 (1978).
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the National Cancer Act of 1971.8 This adds up to fertile ground for any
proposed cure with a glimmer of hope, especially one that inflicts less suffer-
ing than the approved chemotherapies. Of all the unsanctioned remedies
proffered in the last two decades, none has had the staying power of Laetrile,
the drug that refuses to disappear despite the efforts of federal drug regulators
and a majority of the medical community. 82
Laetrile has been around since the 1950s. 83 With varying degrees of
accuracy, it is also called amygdalin and, in an unsuccessful effort to avoid
being classed as a drug, vitamin B-17.84 Some of its proponents have claimed
that it works by releasing cyanide in the body in such a way as to attack
cancerous cells more than normal cells. 5 Other proponents claim that it
works in some unknown way against cancer cells.86 Still others assert that it is
a nutritional supplement which, rather than attacking the cancer itself,
promotes the well-being of the body's immune system, thus helping it fight the
cancerous growth naturally. 8
In addition to those who claim that Laetrile is an active agent in resisting
cancer, there are those who merely allege that the substance eases the pain of
cancer and its approved treatments;88 they tout Laetrile as a supplement
rather than an alternative to conventional treatment. Almost all Laetrile sup-
porters insist that its ingestion be part of a larger nutritional program aimed in
part at combating the wasting effects of cancer.89
Medical opinion has been generally hostile to Laetrile. 9° Federal drug
laws require extensive clinical testing, first on animal models, then on human
volunteers, before a cancer drug can be licensed for even limited distribu-
tion. 9' The responsible agency, the Federal Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), can issue temporary licenses for experimental testing.92 Without the
experimental license, the necessary documentation cannot be assembled in
81. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
82. "However much we may wish it to, Laetrile is not about to disappear." Relman, Laetrilomania-
Again, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. NIED. 215 (1978).
83. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,771-72 (1977).
84. Id. at 39,770, 39,801.
85. Id. at 39,773-74.
86. Id. at 39,772-73.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 39,785-86. The wasting effect--cachexia-is a leading cause of death among cancer victims.
Laetrile supporters claim that the drug increases appetite and reverses the cachexia. People v. Privitera, 23 Cal.
3d 697, 715, 591 P.2d 919,929, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431,441 (Bird, C. J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
90. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,781 (1977); Ingelfinger, Laetrilomania, 296 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1167
(1977).
91. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976), prohibits the distribution of any "new drug" unless the federal government has
approved an application supported by substantial evidence of the drug's safety and effectiveness. The authority
for approval is delegated from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to the Commissioner of the Food
and Drug Administration. 21 C.F.R. § 5.1(a) (1) (1980). The Commissioner may grant investigational licenses
provided that adequate preclinical tests, including tests on animals, have taken place. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1)
(1976).
92. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i) (1976).
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the required fashion, and the FDA's refusal to issue the license has prevented
definitive answers to the question of Laetrile's efficacy or safety.
93
A drug must be safe as well as efficacious under current federal drug law
before it can be approved for distribution. 94 FDA refusal to give Laetrile a
chance to prove or disprove itself has not sat well with a number of trial
judges faced with demands from cancer patients who wish to use the forbid-
den drug. 95 From the standpoint of scientifically controlled, conclusive test-
ing, Laetrile's effectiveness has been neither proved nor disproved. 96 Its sup-
porters have marshaled "evidence" in the form of individual patients' success
stories.97 This kind of anecdotal evidence is dismissed by the medical and
regulatory establishment in a fashion that many supporters cannot under-
stand. 98 The refusal to test and the refusal to accept anecdotal evidence in
place of the required clinical tests have inflamed rather than quieted the
controversy. 99
Twenty states have legalized Laetrile within their borders.'"o A Medical
Freedom of Choice bill'0 ' has garnered 115 sponsors in the U.S. House of
Representatives. 10 2 The bill would eliminate the requirement of safety.'0 3
Reacting to what they perceive as FDA intransigence, and recognizing that it
has served merely to prolong rather than answer the question of Laetrile's
effectiveness, some prestigious members of the medical establishment have
called for clinical testing, which they hope would settle the issue.14 A few
respected physicians have even called for legalizing Laetrile as simply the
most expedient way to put the matter to rest. 05 Until recently, the FDA has
even resisted the request of another government agency, the National Cancer
Institute (NCI), for permission to clinically test Laetrile.'16 This has forced the
NCI to engage in a "retrospective" study of the drug in which individual case
93. See Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 218, 218-19 (1978).
94. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1976).
95. See, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1212-13 (W.D. Okla. 1975). aff'd on other
grounds, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 442 U.S. 544 (1979), wherein the district court
found that the FDA, in refusing to either approve or reject a new drug application for Laetrile, had created a
procedural dilemma for plaintiffs, who were unable to appeal the FDA nonaction in the absence of an order.
96. "[O]pponents of Laetrile have no more scientifically acceptable evidence to deny its effectiveness than
advocates have to claim such effectiveness. The simple fact is that Laetrile has never been properly studied in
the hands of those competent to make such ajudgment." Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND
J. MED. 218, 218 (1978).
97. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,797, 39,799 (1977).
98. Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 218, 218-19 (1978).
99. Id.; Ingelfinger. Laetrilomania, 296 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1167 (1977); Relman. Laetrilomania-
Again, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 215 (1978).
100. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1980, § A, at 11, col. 1.
101. H.R. 54, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
102. 36 CONG. Q. 689, 692 (1978).
103. Id. The U.S. Senate also amended a section of the Carter Administration's proposed Drug Reform Act
(S. 1075), which had sought to give the FDA complete intrastate authority. This would have effectively nullified
the state laws legalizing Laetrile. Id. at 689. The amendments exempt drugs specifically permitted by state
statutes from FDA authority. 37 CONG. Q. 2349, 2352 (1979).
104. Moertel. A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 218. 218-19 (1978); Relman. Laetrilo-
mania, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 215, 216 (1978).
105. Crile, Legalization of Laetrile-A Suggestion, 295 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 116 (1976).
106. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1980, § A, at 11, col. 1.
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histories were submitted to a scientific panel for evaluation.'0 7 The results
were inconclusive.' 8 A dissident group within one of the nation's largest
cancer research centers has accused the center of wanting laboratory tests of
Laetrile to fail.' °9
There is some dissent within the ranks of medical practitioners. "0 In one
stunning case a physician member of the California Medical Board reportedly
admitted, during a hearing by the board to revoke the license of another
physician for prescribing Laetrile, that he had prescribed it for his own
cancer. The board's counsel, a California assistant attorney general, was
quoted as saying that he would have done the same thing."' There is a belief
among at least some members of the medical establishment that the govern-
ment's handling of Laetrile has backfired. For instance, the editor of the
prestigious New England Journal of Medicine, himself a cancer victim who
remains opposed to the use of Laetrile in cancer treatment, has pointed out
that "an establishment indictment of a popular remedy is one of the best
advertisements for the remedy. Thus when the FDA, the AMA or an es-
teemed fellow medical editor inveighs against Laetrile, I suspect they are
unintentionally increasing the demand.""' 2 A New Jersey court was even
more direct: "Unintentionally, those opposed to the use of [L]aetrile may
have helped to perpetuate the myth of its remedial value by depriving vic-
tims ... of access to the drug." '3 A physician wrote to his colleagues that
"our rhetoric of damnation and indignation is not effective and, indeed, can
be counterproductive.
" 4
As will be illustrated below," 5 the Laetrile issue has been just as active in
state and federal courts. The combination of legislation, litigation, and medi-
cal dissension means that "Laetrile is not about to disappear." " 6 The current
situation is that an estimated 75,000 Americans have taken it illegally,' no
one has proven that it does or does not work, "8 and it is available only to
107. Newell, Why the National Cancer Institute Chooses a Case-Record Review of Laetrile, 298 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 216 (1978).
108. Ellison, Byar & Newell, Special Report on Laetrile: The NCI Laetrile Review, 299 NEW ENGLAND J.
MED. 549, 552 (1978).
109. Some employees of Sloan-Kettering Memorial Institute published a critique of the Institute's state-
ment that it had found no evidence that Lactrile is beneficial in cancer treatment. The critique challenged, among
other things, the statement's claim that Laetrile had failed in an experimental setting in which conventional
anticancer drugs had succeeded; in fact, the critique said, no known anti-cancer drug is effective in the particular
setting. 113 SCi. NEWS 4 (1978).
110. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,785-86 (1977).
Ill. San Jose Mercury, April 10. 1974, at 1, cited in Amicus Curiae Brief for Respondent. at 186, People v.
Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
112. Ingelfinger, Laetrilomania, 296 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1167 (1977). Accord, Moertel, A Trial of
Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 218, 219 (1978).
113. Suenram v. Society of the Valley Hosp., 155 N.J. Super. 593, 598, 383 A.2d 143, 146 (Law Div. 1977).
114. Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 218, 219 (1978).
115. See text accompanying notes 120-212 infra.
116. Relman, Laetrilomania--Again, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 215 (1978).
117. Id. at 216.
118. Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 218, 218-219 (1978).
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those who are willing to break the law or travel abroad." 9 After examining
how a number of courts have dealt with the issue, this Comment will make
suggestions for taking the drug out of limbo.
II. LAETRILE CASES AND PRIVACY
A. Rutherford
The leading federal litigation dealing with Laetrile is Rutherford v. United
States.20 The subject of nine orders z'2 or opinions and one administrative
hearing by the FDA, 22 Rutherford began when a number of terminally ill
cancer patients sought to enjoin the government from interfering with their
access to Laetrile. The district court found that Laetrile was both safe and
effective and ordered the government to permit its use by one,12 and eventu-
ally others, of the plaintiffs. 24 The court reasoned that the denial of freedom
of choice for treatment by Laetrile is a deprivation of life, liberty, or property
without the due process of law guaranteed by the fifth amendment. '2 Due
process was denied by the FDA's refusal to issue a formal refusal to test
Laetrile; without that formal refusal, the plaintiffs could not appeal the FDA
inaction on Laetrile to the court of appeals.
2 6
The Tenth Circuit allowed the injunction to stand but instructed the
district court to remand the case to the FDA for determination whether Lae-
trile was a "new drug" under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 27 If
Laetrile was not a new drug, it could be grandfathered in and would be
exempt from the efficacy requirements that apply to new drug applications.
Only the drug's safety would then be within the FDA's jurisdiction. Following
administrative hearings, the FDA Commissioner issued a decision in July
1977. 28 He found that there was no uniform definition of Laetrile, that in its
various forms Laetrile was a "new drug" under the Act because it was not
119. Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1296, 1300 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th
Cir. 1977), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
120. The history of the Rutherford litigation is as follows: Rutherford v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 1203
(W.D. Okla. 1975)(remanding to the FDA), aff'd 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976)(affirming the district court's
remand to the FDA), on remand, 424 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Okla. 1977)(remanding to the FDA), 429 F. Supp. 506
(W.D. Okla. 1977)(again remanding to the FDA and enjoining the FDA from preventing the importation and use
of Laetrile by the plaintiffs), 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla. 1977)(again remanding to the FDA and enjoining the
FDA from preventing the importation and use of Laetrile by the plaintiffs), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir.
1978)(affirming the district court's remand to and injunction of the FDA), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544 (1979)(reversing
and remanding to the court of appeals), on remand, 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980)(remanding to district court to
reverse injunction against FDA), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 336 (1980).
121. See note 120 supra.
122. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768 (1977).
123. 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1212-14 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 442 U.S.
544 (1979).
124. 429 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1977), rev'd 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
125. 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1213 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544
(1979).
126. Id. at 1212-13.
127. 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
128. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768 (1977).
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generally recognized as safe and effective for its prescribed use, and that the
drug did not qualify for exemption under either of the Act's grandfather
clauses. 29 The district court sustained the Commissioner's findings that
Laetrile was a "new drug" because it was not generally recognized as safe
and effective. 30 While sustaining one of the grandfather clause denials, 3' the
court refused the other because it depended on a showing that Laetrile was
unsafe at the time the clause was adopted-a finding the court held was not
substantiated by the evidence presented at the FDA hearings. 3 2 The court
therefore ruled that Laetrile was entitled to exemption from the rigorous
premarketing testing requirements. 3 The court also held, for the first time in
this case, that "by denying the right to use a nontoxic substance in connection
with one's own personal health-care, FDA has offended the constitutional
right of privacy." 134
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit once again affirmed the district court on
different grounds. '35 This time the court of appeals held that the Act's terms of
"safe" and "effective" have no reasonable application for terminally ill
patients. 136 The constitutional issue was not addressed.
In a unanimous decision, 37 the United States Supreme Court reversed
the Tenth Circuit. The Court refused to recognize any implied exemption
from the purview of the Act for terminally ill patients. It found "no license to
depart from the plain language of the Act, for Congress could reasonably have
intended to shield terminal patients from ineffectual or unsafe drugs." 38 The
Court accepted the FDA finding that a drug is effective if it fulfills claims of
prolonged life, improved physical condition, or reduced pain. 39 The Court
also found that safety of a drug does have meaning for terminally ill patients.
In a somewhat conclusory statement, the Court said: "For the terminally ill,
as for anyone else, a drug is unsafe if its potential for inflicting death or
physical injury is not offset by the possibility of therapeutic benefit."' 4
Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court never explained just how death or
injury have meaning for someone who is dying and who has rejected conven-
tional cancer treatment because of its pain or hopelessness. The opinion went
on to accept FDA testimony from the Laetrile hearings concerning the
129. Id. at 39,806.
130. 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1292-93 (W.D. Okla. 1977), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 442 U.S.
544 (1979).
131. Id. at 1298.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1301.
134. Id. In the first Rutherford opinion by the district court, the right of privacy was discussed without
being invoked. 399 F. Supp. 1208, 1214 (W.D. Okla. 1975), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 442 U.S.
544 (1979).
135. 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
136. Id. at 1236-37.
137. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
138. Id. at 555.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 555-56.
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claimed difficulty of identifying the terminally ill "except in retrospect."' 4'
This evidence was used in support of the contention that a drug such as
Laetrile can be unsafe when it diverts a patient from possibly beneficial con-
ventional therapy. 42 This refusal to recognize medicine's ability to identify
any patient as terminal until after his death 43 conveniently resolved the
Court's inability to show just how a terminal patient can be hurt by an ineffec-
tive or unsafe drug.
The opinion notes that cancer patients for whom regular therapies are
ineffective may resort to experimental cancer drugs under the terms of the
Act.'44 In so doing, it ignores the practical impossibilities of qualifying drugs
that are not developed under the aegis of the large pharmaceutical com-
panies. 45 The FDA requires extensive documentation far beyond the
anecdotal claims available for Laetrile.' 46 The Court likewise ignored the
FDA's long intransigence against any kind of experimental clinical trial of
Laetrile-a stubbornness that has even extended to turning down requests
from another government agency. 1
47
The decision was restricted to the Court's reading the Act to encompass
terminally ill patients. The Court specifically refused to address the constitu-
tional right of privacy issue and the grandfather clause question-issues that
formed the basis for the trial court decision but that were not dealt with by the
Tenth Circuit.148 The case was remanded for further consideration by the
court of appeals of those issues. 149 In a brief opinion,'50 the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court's holdings on both the grandfathering of Laetrile
and, apparently, on the choice of treatment afforded by the right of privacy.
The latter issue was not discussed, the court being content to note "in the
context with which we are here concerned that the decision by a patient
whether to have a treatment or not is a protected right, but his selection of a
particular treatment .... is within the area of governmental interest in pro-
tecting public health." 15' The Supreme Court denied certiorari.' 52 The ques-
tion whether the right of privacy covers a person's right to unconventional
medical treatment thus has not been addressed above the district court level
in the federal judiciary.
141. Id. at 556.
142. Id. at 557.
143. Id. at 556.
144. Id. at 558.
145. One proponent of the Medical Freedom of Choice bill, see note 101 supra, estimates that the average
cost of developing and licensing a new drug is $12 million. 35 CONG. Q. 1346, 1347 (1977).
146. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 310 (1980) (new drugs); 21 C.F.R. § 312 (1980) (new drugs for investigational
use); 21 C.F.R. § 314 (1980) (new drug applications).
147. The National Cancer Institute sought FDA permission to clinically test Laetrile for more than one
year. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1980, § A at 11, col. I.
148. 442 U.S. 544, 559 n.18 (1979).
149. Id.
150. 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 336 (1980).
151. 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980). The opinion has an air of resignation about it. Although the court
mentioned the FDA's "record" with apparent sarcasm, id. at 456, it refused to grapple again with a review of
the record, presumably because of the Supreme Court's upholding of the FDA's authority and actions. Id.
152. 101 S. Ct. 336 (1980).
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B. Privitera
The leading state court case applying the right of privacy to the use of
Laetrile is People v. Privitera,'5 3 in which a physician and others who were
supplying Laetrile to cancer patients were charged with violating a California
statute that makes it a misdemeanor to provide any drug for the treatment of
cancer unless it has been approved by either the FDA or a state board.'" A
California court of appeals had reversed the defendants' convictions because,
among other things, the statute infringed on the patients' fundamental right of
privacy under both the California and United States Constitutions.'55 The
appeals court reached much further back than Griswold. It found that
Americans' right of privacy is older than the Constitution. The court stated,
"It is in the nature of man that such right exists." 56 The opinion quoted Judge
Cardozo's famous statement that "every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body," '
57
and Justice Brandeis' equally well-known dissent in Olmstead v. United
States, wherein Brandeis called "the right to be let alone" from government
intrusion "the right most valued by civilized man." ss The opinion then traced
the Supreme Court's evolvement of the modern right of privacy and con-
cluded that the right to make personal medical decisions-including "foolish"
ones- 59 was encompassed by the right of privacy and could be overcome
only by the showing of a compelling state interest.16° It failed to find such an
interest in the absolute prohibition of Laetrile to cancer patients.'
6
'
The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals by holding
that the right to drugs of unproven efficacy is not encompassed by the right of
privacy under either the United States or California Constitutions. 62 Having
failed to find a fundamental privacy right, the court subjected the California
cancer drug statute to a rational basis test and, not surprisingly, upheld it.'63
The court refused to contemplate any enlargement of the federal right of
privacy. It purported to show that the United States Supreme Court had fixed
the bounds of the right by quoting a passage from Whalen v. Roe to the effect
that the right involves "matters relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships and child rearing and education." 6 By omitting the
153. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
154. The defendants argued the patients' right to Laetrile derivatively. Id. at 713, 591 P.2d at 928, 153 Cal.
Rptr. at 440.
155. 141 Cal. Rptr. 764, 777 (Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
156. Id. at 768.
157. Id. at 770, quoting Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30. 105 N.E. 92,93
(1914), overruled on other grounds, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
158. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
159. 141 Cal. Rptr. 764, 770 (Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
160. Id. at 777.
161. Id. at 783-84.
162. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 702-09, 591 P.2d 919, 921-26, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431,433-38, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949
(1979).
163. Id. at 702, 591 P.2d at 921, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
164. Id.
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Abortion Cases 65 from the list, the California court concluded that the right
did not involve medical treatment.' 66 The California court further ignored
United States Supreme Court statements 67 that the boundaries of the right of
privacy have not yet been fixed; it treated the matter as a fully developed one,
rather than one which is still evolving.
Even though it had decided that no fundamental right of privacy existed
in Privitera, the California court nevertheless felt constrained to point out that
the United States Supreme Court had never found the right to be absolute.'1S
Why this should matter, once the right is not found to apply, is unclear.
Equally mysterious is the court's grappling' 69 with the level of scrutiny used in
the Abortion Cases: 170 if neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classifica-
tion is involved, no application of strict scrutiny is called for, regardless of
what the United States Supreme Court did in the Abortion Cases, or in any
other cases involving the right to privacy. The California court was apparently
uncomfortable with its conclusory statement 7' that a fundamental right of
privacy is not at stake where a cancer victim desires unconventional treat-
ment, and sought to dispose of the Abortion Cases-the ones most analogous
to the issue at hand-in some other manner. This the court attempted to do by
asserting that Roe v. Wade 72 used a rational basis test "when a danger to
health exists." '71 In reality, as previously pointed out,174 the Court continued
its high level of scrutiny through all three trimesters, finding the privacy right
eventually overcome by the state's compelling interest in the woman's health
as the fetus matures and abortion becomes riskier.
The California court then addressed another United States Supreme
Court privacy case, Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, '75
and interpreted it to mean that although the abortion decision is within the
zone of privacy and deserving of the compelling state interest standard, "the
selection of a particular procedure is a medical matter to which privacy status
does not attach. . ." and which could be regulated under the rational basis
standard. 176 Actually, the Supreme Court rejected the State's preselection of
medical procedures in Planned Parenthood. 77 Although it failed to refer to
the constitutional right of privacy in striking down this prohibition of a
165. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
166. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 702, 591 P.2d 919, 921, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 433, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
167. [T]he outer limits of [the privacy interest in making certain kinds of important decisions] have not
been marked by the Court .... .- Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977).
168. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 703, 591 P.2d 919, 922, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 434, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
169. Id.
170. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
171. "[A] fundamental privacy right is not at stake here." 23 Cal. 3d 697, 702, 591 P.2d 919, 921, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 431, 433, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
172. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
173. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 703, 591 P.2d 919, 922, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 434, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
174. See text accompanying notes 14-16, 41-42 supra.
175. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
176. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 703-04, 591 P.2d 919, 922, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 434, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
177. 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976).
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medical procedure, 78 the fact of omission would appear less conclusive with
regard to the level of scrutiny than the fact that a state statute is virtually
never struck down under rational basis analysis. This points to a more
stringent level of review.
The California court also treated Whalen v. Roe as analogous to
Privitera. 179 In Whalen v. Roe,'80 however, the Supreme Court was upholding
a state statute regulating the sale of narcotics, whereas in Privitera the state
was prohibiting outright the distribution of Laetrile. Perhaps mindful of the
differences between the two cases, the California court quoted Whalen v. Roe
out of context: "the State no doubt could prohibit entirely the use of particu-
lar [narcotic] drugs."'18 ' The Privitera court determined that if the state has
the power to ban a drug with a recognized medical use because of its potential
for abuse, then "the state clearly has the power to ban a drug not recognized
as effective for its intended use." '2 A full reading of the sentence in its
original context yields a different interpretation:
Nor can it be said that any individual has been deprived of the right to decide
independently, with the advice of his physician, to acquire and to use needed
medication. Although the State no doubt could prohibit entirely the use of particu-
lar Schedule II drugs, it has not done so. This case is therefore unlike those in
which the Court held that a total prohibition of certain conduct was an impermis-
sible deprivation of liberty. 183
Although the meaning is not crystal clear, it certainly seems like a warning,
instead of an invitation, to states that would prohibit rather than regulate. The
warning is that the Court considers prohibitions, as opposed to regulations, to
be in such different categories that they can be found to be impermissible
deprivations. In any event, this speculative passage from Whalen v. Roe is
dicta.
California Chief Justice Rose Bird, herself a former cancer victim,184
dissented strongly.'85 Pointing out the lack of a truly effective treatment for
cancer,86 she wrote that in the absence of a clear showing that Laetrile is
unsafe, each patient has the right to obtain the drug from a licensed physician
who is willing to prescribe it.'7 She reasoned that since cancer is a disease
with potentially fatal consequences, the choice of treatment is "one of the
more important decisions a person may ever make, touching intimately on his
178. Id.
179. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 704,591 P.2d 919, 922-23, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431,434-35,cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949(1979).
180. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
181. 23 Cal. 3d 697, 705, 591 P.2d 919, 923, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 435, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
182. Id.
183. 429 U.S. 589, 603 (1977) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
184. NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 1977, at 70.
185. Chief Justice Bird's dissent incorporates most of the court of appeals opinion. 23 Cal. 3d 697,711-40,
591 P.2d 919, 927-46, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 439-58 (Bird, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
186. Id. at 711, 591 P.2d at 927, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
187. Id.
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or her being." 88 For her, it follows that the right of privacy, under both the
Federal and California Constitutions, "prevents the state from interfering
with a person's choice of treatment on the sole grounds that the person has
chosen a treatment which the state considers "ineffective." 189
The Supreme Court declined to resolve the California Supreme Court's
differing views of the federal right of privacy when it refused to grant
certiorari.'90
The Privitera result stands in contrast to the holdings of most courts that
have faced the problem of whether the right to Laetrile falls within the federal
right of privacy. One author notes that "a trend towards greater respect for
the wishes of the individual--even if they run counter to those of society in
preserving life-has become apparent in recent years." 191 As noted above,' 9 "
a number of decisions have affirmed a patient's right to reject treatment.
Given that right, does the patient then have the right to an unproven
"remedy" such as Laetrile? Several courts have answered affirmatively.
C. Related Cases
In Rizzo v. United States, 193 a federal district court granted a preliminary
injunction against government denial of Laetrile to the plaintiff, who was
dying of pancreatic cancer. Although the court refrained from definitive hold-
ings on the application of the privacy doctrine to Laetrile in the context of a
preliminary injunction,' 94 it noted that the parameters of the privacy right
have not been clearly defined and implied that the plaintiff's situation would
qualify for such an application.195 A New Jersey trial court took an expansive
view in Suenram v. Society of the Valley Hospital:'96 "The issue here is
human liberty and the right of an informed terminal cancer victim to choose
which treatment she shall receive from a state-licensed physician."' 97 The
court said that the right could not be of a more fundamental nature. '9 A
Florida court of appeals held that a patient's voluntary informed election of a
non-harmful treatment not endorsed by the medical profession fell within the
zone of privacy guaranteed by the Florida Constitution. '" The court implied in
dicta that the federal right of privacy was also sufficiently broad to encompass
such a decision. 200 In United States v. Evers,20' a case similar to the Florida
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
191. Drake, What To Do When a Patient Refuses Treatment, LEGAL ASPECTS MED. PRACTICE, Oct.
1979, at 22.
192. See text accompanying notes 49-66 supra.
193. 432 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
194. Id. at 359.
195. Id. at 358.
196. 155 N.J. Super. 593, 383 A.2d 143 (Law Div. 1977).
197. Id. at 601, 383 A.2d at 147.
198. Id. at 602, 383 A.2d at 148.
199. Rogers v. State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 371 So. 2d 1037 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 376 So. 2d 76
(Fla. 1979).
200. Id. at 1040.
201. 453 F. Supp. 1141 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
[Vol. 42:523
LAETRILE AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
case and involving the same alternative, unapproved treatment (chelation
therapy drug prescribed for arteriosclerosis), a federal district court spoke of
a patient's right, under the privacy doctrine, to receive medical care in
accordance with his licensed physician's best judgment. 202 A federal district
court in California has granted a cancer patient's request for Laetrile. °3
In the well-known Chad Greene case,204 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, which affirmed denials of the parents' requests for Laetrile
treatments for their leukemic child, specifically disclaimed any consideration
of the privacy doctrine in reaching its holding.205 The New York Court of
Appeals, in reaching an opposite conclusion on a similar petition by parents of
a child with Hodgkins' disease,2 6 focused its opinion on the issue of whether
the child was "neglected" under a parental responsibility statute.20 7 Because
the patients in both cases were young minors, efforts to establish their right to
an informed freedom of choice would have been complicated and, accord-
ingly, were not addressed by either court.
The contrary results in the two cases can be explained by differing court-
perceived efficacies of the disputed treatments. The New York Court of
Appeals found some evidence that the so-called nutritional therapy (Laetrile
plus various dietary supplements) might be effective, and some evidence that
the conventional remedy was failing.2u On the other hand, the Massachusetts
Court was faced with "essentially uncontested" evidence that the conven-
tional therapy was controlling Chad Greene's leukemia; 2°9 that the parents'
ending of that therapy had been followed by a resumption of the leukemia;
2
'
0
and that the nutritional therapy for Chad Greene was useless and
dangerous.21' Both courts, then, found themselves in the role of assessing the
efficacies and side-effects of alternative treatments. Neither one invoked the
right of privacy in reaching a decision.
III. RECENT GOVERNMENT ACTIONS ON LAETRILE
212In response to the continued pressure for state legalization of Laetile,
legal proceedings such as Rutherford,2 3 and letters from patients and their
physicians, the National Cancer Institute undertook a "retrospective" study
202. Id. at 1150.
203. Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1980). Contra, Judkins v. United States, [1978]
FOOD DRUG COS. L. REP. (CCH) 38,179 (D. Ore. 1978): "'The outer limits of the right to privacy have not yet
been determined, but I am satisfied that the right [of a cancer patient to choose Laetrile therapy] does not fall
within its perimeter." Id. at 38,730.
204. Custody of a Minor. __ Mass. __ 393 N.E.2d 836 (1979).
205. Id. at - , 393 N.E.2d at 844.
206. In re Hofbauer, 47 N.Y.2d 648, 393 N.E. 2d 1009, 419 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1979).
207. Id. at 654, 393 N.E.2d at 1011, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
208. Id. at 657, 393 N.E.2d at 1014, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 941.
209. __ Mass. at __, 393 N.E.2d at 846.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
213. See text accompanying notes 120-49 supra.
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of Laetrile in 1978.214 Unlike a clinical trial, which seeks to compare the
responses of two matched groups, one to the drug under trial and the other to
a placebo, the NCI retrospectively screened claims of Laetrile cures and
submitted them to a panel that looked for objective evidence of the cures.21 5
NCI resisted the clinical trials in part because of what it perceived as the
ethical problem of submitting humans to a therapy that had not previously
been proven in animal models.216
The NCI retrospective was disappointing to all factions. Although hun-
dreds of thousands of physicians were solicited for cases thought to have had
objective benefit from Laetrile, only ninety-three were submitted to the
agency for evaluation.2 7 The best documented of these were matched with
counterpart cases selected from the ranks of the conventionally treated, and
submitted to the panel. The panel judged six cases to have evidenced a
response. The results were found to be inconclusive. 2'8 NCI officials con-
cluded that "this retrospective analysis illustrates the difficulty of drawing
inferences about therapeutic efficacy in the absence of properly designed
random trials., 2
19
It should be noted that the retrospective sought only evidence of the
regression of a measurable tumor.220 Such subjective responses as diminution
of pain, regaining of appetite, and feeling of well-being were not scrutinized. 22!
Thus, the retrospective failed to address one of the primary claims made by
Laetrile's proponents. As a test of clinical effectiveness, the retrospective
seemed "doomed to failure" from the start, in the words of one medical
commentator, who pointed out that, on the one hand, no clinical pharma-
cologist would accept such evidence for proof of effectiveness, while on the
other hand, the American public would not accept it for proof of ineffective-
ness.
222
Presumably because of the inconclusive nature of the retrospective trials,
the NCI decided to attempt clinical testing. To do this, it had to obtain FDA
approval.23 After more than a year of seeking such approval, 224 NCI finally
obtained a conditional permit requiring it to first perform another test on
animals, and then conduct a test on human volunteers to assay the toxicity of
Laetrile when ingested in combination with the "metabolic diet" its pro-
214. Newell, Why the National Cancer Institute Chooses a Case-Record Review of Laetrile, 298 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 216 (1978).
215. Id. at 217-18.
216. Id. at 216.
217. Ellison, Byar & Newell, Special Report on Laetrile: The NCI Laetrile Review, 299 NEW ENGLAND J.
MED. 549, 552 (1978).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Newell, Why the National Cancer Institute Chooses a Case-Record Review of Laetrile, 298 NEW
ENGLAND J. MED. 216, 217 (1978).
221. Id.
222. Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 218, 219 (1978).
223. There is no special exemption for government agencies from the new drug application procedures. 21
U.S.C. § 355 (1977).
224. N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1980, § A, at If, col. I.
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ponents presently favor.23 If the toxicity is sufficiently low, FDA is expected
to permit a full clinical trial. The full trial would be limited, however, to
patients for whom conventional therapy has failed or who suffer from cancers
with no known method of treatment.
226
Although the FDA permit is a breakthrough for those who wish to resolve
the Laetrile issue definitively, it falls short of the kind of trial that is needed
for full resolution. For one thing, the insistence on the animal pre-test has
been criticized as being postulated on the assumption that animals serve as
reliable models for human responses to cancer treatments. 27 For another,
restricting the clinical trials to hopeless cases is bound to be seen by many as
loading the dice against Laetrile. 2s
FDA reluctance to include other than hopeless cases may be due to the
agency's fear that doing so would implicitly recognize the right of informed,
consenting volunteers to ingest Laetrile instead of conventional drugs. If such
a right does not exist-and FDA has argued that it does not-then there is an
ethical question of allowing such participation in a clinical trial. 229 Critics of
this reluctance have argued that, since Laetrile has never been properly
studied in a clinical trial, there is no scientifically acceptable proof of its
ineffectiveness. 23° Unlike other purportedly "quack" medicines, it has been
legalized in many states. 23' Americans overwhelmingly favor legalizing it.232 It
is conservatively estimated that 50,000 persons ingested Laetrile in 1977. 3
There is also the "lingering doubt" in scientific minds, in the absence of proof
to the contrary, that the "overwhelming public acceptance" of the drug may
reflect some kind of effectiveness or relief.234 Considering the number of
nonterminal patients who will turn to Laetrile, many of them without proper
medical supervision, it seems just as unethical to argue for the present system
as for a clinical trial that would involve a representative cross-section of
informed, consenting patients. 2 In any case, there are ethical objections to
rigid, double-blind clinical trials of all proposed cures for a fatal disease: half
the patients-those in the control group--will be receiving a useless placebo
although they consented to a trial of the drug being tested rather than to the
placebo. 6 From the standpoint of the Laetrile opponents, the ethical problem
is simply this: all of the patients are subjected to what the opponents see as a
useless drug.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 218 (1978).
228. See, e.g., Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir.
1977), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
229. Lipsett & Fletcher, Ethics of Laetrile Clinical Trials, 297 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1183 (1977).
230. Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 218 (1978).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 218-19.
233. Id. at 219.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Lipsett & Fletcher, Ethics of Laetrile Clinical Trials, 297 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1183 (1977).
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In sum, the FDA has been reluctant to authorize any testing, however
informed and voluntary, of any new drug that has not met its rigid screening
standards. To allow informed volunteers to ingest Laetrile, which has not met
the pretesting standards, might open the door to recognition of the right of all
cancer patients to give an informed consent to the purveyors of Laetrile.
Ethical problems already exist, however, in current conventional double-
blind clinical trials.
IV. THE PRIVACY DOCTRINE SHOULD PROTECT CANCER VICTIMS'
ACCESS TO LAETRILE
This Comment will attempt to show that the privacy doctrine encom-
passes a cancer patient's right to refuse conventional medical treatment, that
a patient who has refused conventional treatment is entitled to try unconven-
tional alternative treatments, that the Government's total cancer approach
defies rational analysis, and that, in sum, the Government has failed to do a
reasonable job of developing state-sanctioned alternatives for most cancer
patients and therefore lacks a compelling interest in prohibiting the use of
Laetrile.
A. Right to Refuse Treatment
The Patient's Bill of Rights endorsed by the American Medical Associa-
tion recognizes a right to refuse treatment.237 This right is qualified because it
is only as great as the extent permitted by law. 23 With the exception of
emergency situations, it seems settled that patients do have the right to refuse
treatment, even to the extent of jeopardizing their lives. 239 This right is being
increasingly found under the privacy doctrine. A federal court extended the
right to a mental patient to reject the pain of conventional cancer treatment in
Rennie v. Klein.2 0 Presumably, a sane, knowing patient would also have that
right. The privacy doctrine was also invoked in Runnels v. Rosendale,24' in
which a state prison inmate was held to have the right to reject an unwanted
operation.
The countervailing government interests include (1) the preservation of
life, (2) the protection of the interests of innocent third parties, (3) the preven-
tion of suicide, and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession.242 As the right-to-die cases illustrate, 243 the preservation of life
interest can be overcome by the patient's right to decide to terminate life
when the patient has determined that it is no longer worth living. The govern-
237. See Bandman & Bandman, There Is Nothing Automatic About Rights, in BIOETHICS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 268, 272 (1978).
238. Id.
239. See text accompanying notes 48-66 supra.
240. 426 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978).
241. 499 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974).
242. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
243. See text accompanying notes 48-66 supra.
[Vol. 42:523
LAETRILE AND THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
ment interest here must be distinguished from that invoked in public water
treatment, vaccination, and other mass-treatment invasions of bodily integ-
rity. In the latter, the government is preserving well people from harm; it is
not prolonging anyone's misery; and its "treatments" (purifying water,
administering vaccines) have been demonstrably safer than the diseases they
prevent.2" In short, the benefits far outweigh the impositions. By contrast,
most cancer victims know that their chances of dying are high regardless of
what they do,245 and that their state-sanctioned treatments are painful and
only moderately effective. 246 Rather than preserving life, the state is prolong-
ing misery.
The interests of innocent third parties have been given judicial protection
in cases in which a parent has refused treatment, such as a blood transfusion,
that is clearly life-saving and that would return the patient to a productive
life. 247 Similarly, the state's interest in preventing suicide is most likely to be
invoked where the treatment is effective, the chance of a full cure is good, and
the patient is responsible for others. 248 Preservation of the ethical integrity of
the medical profession does not demand that all approved cures be forced on
the unwilling patient. As the Quinlan case demonstrates,- there is a body of
medical opinion that is not averse to withholding treatment from hopeless
cases, even when the patient in those cases cannot consent to the withhold-
ing;2 0 and the American Hospital Association's Patient Bill of Rights recog-
nizes the right to decline treatment, subject only to legal, rather than medical,limitations. 25'
As the Saikewicz court put it, "The value of life [under the constitutional
right of privacy as an expression of self-determination] is lessened not by a
decision to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a competent human
being the right of choice.
' 252
B. Right to Alternative, Unapproved Treatment
If a patient has the right to refuse treatment, it is arguably but a short step
to the proposition that he has the right to unconventional, unsanctioned treat-
ment methods. In the case of Laetrile, if the drug is as ineffective as the FDA
244. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 1I, 38-39 (1905)(smallpox vaccination can be com-
pelled, provided it is not dangerous to an individual).
245. Only about one-third of all people who get cancer will be alive five years after treatment. Rutherford v.
United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1300 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1977), rev'd, 442 U.S. 544
(1979). quoting AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, 1977 CANCER FACTS & FIGURES.
246. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
247. See note 66 supra.
248. Id.
249. 70 N.J. 10, 29, 355 A.2d 647, 657 (1976).
250. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E. 2d 417, 426
(1977).
251. Bandman & Bandman, There is Nothing Automatic About Rights, in BIOETHICS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 268, 272 (1978).
252. Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 742, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
(1977).
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says it is, 253 then its ingestion is the same as no treatment at all. The FDA has
argued that the temptation of Laetrile creates the danger of enticing cancer
patients to abandon conventional treatments in favor of Laetrile. 2- It also
claims that Laetrile itself may not be safe under certain conditions. 255 To
argue that Laetrile should remain illegal because it may tempt cancer victims
to abandon conventional treatments is to presuppose a compelling state
interest in their continuing the conventional treatments. If this interest is
indeed compelling, could it be used to justify the forced consumption of
approved cancer cures? The repugnance of the notion provides the answer.
The safety problem is perhaps the most convincing argument against
Laetrile's legalization. There is clearly a government interest-even a duty-
in protecting its citizens against dangers. This interest can even override an
individual's right to bodily integrity, as in mass vaccinations.256 There are,
however, distinctions between the Laetrile controversy and such public
health interests as vaccinations, clean water and untainted food. First, no one
pretends any citizen wants disease, dirty water, or tainted food, whereas the
Laetrile plaintiffs have made a conscious decision to seek out the drug. As
long as the drug stays underground, we cannot know how well educated each
user is about its dangers.257 It seems safe to assume, however, that no Laetrile
user would want it unless he believed that its benefits outweigh its dangers.
Second, the government has failed to provide a safe alternative. A sanctioned
treatment that is "a fate worse than death"2 8 does not compare favorably
with the safety of vaccination, clean water, safe food, or fluoridated water.
Third, government's traditional public health interests 25 9 have been preven-
tive; their real analogy in the cancer issue would be government measures to
prevent cancer, as for instance by banning or regulating tobacco consump-
tion.
It is difficult to believe that thousands of Americans deliberately leave
proven cancer cures for the gamble of Laetrile. It is more reasonable to
suppose that they are either unconvinced of the efficacy of conventional
treatments or unwilling to undergo the agony of the side effects. If the former,
they are in good company, and even if wrong, are not doing anything but
refusing treatment-a right recognized by the courts and the medical profes-
sion. If afraid of the pain of conventional treatments, is the answer to force
them to undergo the agony? By denying them a choice of treatments, the
253. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,806 (1977).
254. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1979).
255. That is, Laetrile may itself be toxic. 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,786-87 (1977).
256. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
257. People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 738-39, 591 P.2d 919, 945, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 457 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979); Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED.
218, 219 (1978).
258. See text accompanying notes 73-77 supra.
259. Traditional public health interests include vaccination, clean air, food and water, sewage disposal, and
restaurant licensing.
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government is effectively doing just that, leading one California justice to
conclude that the government is engaging in cruel and inhuman treatment.
260
One of the strongest arguments against unleashing a fundamental right of
privacy in the drug area is that it might sabotage the whole regulatory struc-
ture-that legalizing Laetrile by judicial decree might lead to legalizing bona
fide demands for narcotics and other dangerous drugs. The answer is to
extend the right to unconventional remedies, under the privacy doctrine, only
to those suffering from cancer or other serious disease and who have made an
informed rejection of the state-sanctioned remedies. This would not open up
new areas of abuse. Almost all narcotics are already legally available, under
existing regulatory mechanisms, to cancer patients in pain, in spite of the
universally recognized potential dangers of narcotics. Extending patient
access to include such unproven treatments as Laetrile does not seem radical
in that context.
Interestingly, there is a movement to make marijuana available to cancer
victims in order to alleviate the pains of conventional chemotherapy.
Marijuana is currently prohibited altogether.26' Unlike Laetrile, limited
availability of marijuana is being openly sought by cancer researchers in a
number of states.262 There is a striking similarity between the arguments of
those researchers and the arguments made by Laetrile proponents. Both
groups complain of the violent side effects of chemotherapy and the lack of
any effective treatment for the side effects. 263 Those states that have enacted
permissive laws have typically set up research projects to monitor the results
of each experiment and review boards that pass on the qualifications of
patients and physicians who wish to participate in the research.264 By arguing
for the well-monitored use of marijuana-a substance arguably more contro-
versial than Laetrile-cancer researchers seem to be handling marijuana with
more sophistication. Instead of ignoring the pain of treatments, they are doing
something; instead of forcing patients underground, they are giving them legal
access while at the same time remaining able to observe any benefits that may
in fact exist from use of marijuana; and instead of ignoring anecdotal evidence
of relief, the proponent physicians are quoting it.265 The FDA may also be
taking a more relaxed attitude: it has not appealed the District of Columbia
260. People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 693, 740, 591 P.2d 919, 946, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 458 (Newman, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
261. Marijuana is a Schedule I drug and thus cannot legally be prescribed. 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b) (I), 812(c)
(1976).
262. American Med. News, Jan. 26, 1979, at 17-18. See Cohen, Marijuana: Does It Have a Possible
Therapeutic Use?, 240 J.A.M.A. 1761 (1978).
263. Compare text accompanying notes 75-77 supra, with Cohen, Marijuana: Does It Have a Possible
Therapeutic Use?, 240 J.A.M.A. 1761 (1978).
264. American Medical News, Jan. 26, 1979, at 18.
265. The acting director of an Ohio State University cancer clinic, testifying to an Ohio House of Represen-
tatives Subcommittee on a proposal to allow limited use of marijuana in medical situations, told of his patients'
reactions to marijuana. "The drug, like others, has different effects on different people." One patient whose
chemotherapy made her vomit so hard that she broke her spine is now "eating some funny brownies."
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 16, 1980, § A, at 11.
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Superior Court decision that granted access to marijuana to a glaucoma
victim.
266
C. The Right to Know About Medical Alternatives
Courts have recognized a patient's right to be informed of alternative
treatments. 267 They have done this when considering whether consent was
sufficiently informed in the context of medical malpractice actions. 2 S The
American Medical Association's Judicial Council has also recognized an
individual's freedom to elect to receive treatment from outside the ranks of
conventional medicine.269 Such attitudes square well with extending the
privacy right to include personal medical decisions.
D. Practical Considerations
A number of practical reasons can be offered to buttress the foregoing
arguments for bringing the choice of unconventional treatment within the
privacy doctrine. First, making a substance such as Laetrile available, how-
ever restrictively, will serve to demystify it-an argument used by some
physicians who oppose Laetrile but who are convinced that it has been
handled in a way that increases rather than decreases demand. 270 Next, there
has been no conclusive showing that the drug is ineffective or dangerous.27
Making it available to those who elect to use it would, provided accurate
records are kept, serve as the kind of clinical test that the government has
refused to conduct for years. 272 Laetrile is also more liable to be dangerous as
long as it remains underground. There are no standards of purity or
strength.273 Needless to say, there is no government inspection. Since most
physicians are reluctant to chance criminal charges, it is likely that most
Laetrile users take it without benefit of medical advice or supervision.
Then there is always the chance that it works. Courts which have handled
Laetrile cases are remarkably uniform in reserving that question. 274 There is,
of course, a government-approved method for testing the efficacy of new
drugs. The United States method has been criticized as being enormously
266. United States v. Randall, 104 DAILY WASH. L. RFFR. 2249 (1976).
267. Miller v. Kennedy, 91 Wash. 2d 155, 588 P.2d 734 (1978). See also Zebarth v. Swedish Hosp., 81
Wash. 2d 12, 499 P.2d 1 (1972); Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Inst., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 227 N.W.2d 647 (1975).
268. Id.
269. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS AND REPORTS OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL 18
(1960).
270. Crile, Legalization of Laetrile-A Suggestion, 295 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 116 (1976); Ingelfinger,
Laetrilomania, 296 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1167 (1977); 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39,781 (1977).
271. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
272. See text accompanying notes 91-99 supra.
273. Davignon, Contaminated Laetrile: A Health Hazard, 297 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1355 (1977).
274. E.g., "[W]e do not.., imply any opinion on whether that drug may ultimately prove safe and
effective for cancer treatment." United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 558 (1979); -'[W]e emphasize we are
not taking sides on the fiercely contested medical questions regarding Laetrile's safety or efficacy as a cancer
drug." People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 708, 591 P.2d 919, 925, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, 437, cert. denied, 444 U.S.
949 (1979).
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expensive and time-consuming, 275 and efforts are under way to overhaul
federal drug testing law in an attempt to alleviate those problems. 276 But drug
testing will continue to be so expensive that only the major drug companies
are able to sponsor it through the preliminary testing in laboratories and
animals that is necessary before FDA permission is granted for clinical test-
ing. 277 This has led some critics to call for an end to the requirement of
controlled clinical trials before drugs can be tested on willing members of the
public.278 The Federal Republic of Germany, for one, has decided that con-
trolled clinical trials are no longer required before recognition of new drugs. 279
Another practical aspect of persistent importance is the lack of a truly
effective cancer cure despite the intensive efforts of the last decade. As long
as conventional methods are not producing a cure, why not allow willing,
informed patients to, in effect, become guinea pigs for still more substances?
Similarly, a highly structured research procedure may not be the most con-
ducive towards the hoped-for breakthroughs. According to one science
historian, the first needs of science are independence, originality, dissent, and
freedom.280 If the right of a patient to unapproved substances is recognized,
the ethical argument against "inflicting" unproven treatments on a consent-
ing, informed patient will diminish considerably. Researchers would be able
to bypass the preliminary screening with animals-never proven to be an
accurate predictor of human response--28 and go directly to consenting
human subjects. The onus of the decision would be on the subject, not on the
researcher. In any case, when people are dying from a pervasive disease for
which there exists no effective cure, it would seem that pragmatic considera-
tions alone would justify less screening for safety-for how much meaning
does safety have for a cancer victim desperate for a cure?
Finally, the public's confidence in the medical and government drug
regulatory establishment is a matter of great practical importance. As shown
above,282 the government's long-time refusal to test Laetrile on volunteers, its
pursuit of violators and its insistence on the uselessness of Laetrile in the face
of so much testimonial "evidence" have not engendered confidence by the
lay public.283 Without this confidence, ill persons will seek treatment outside
the mainstream of orthodox medicine. A physician skeptical of Laetrile has
recognized that "concerned citizens [are] now wondering whether the
275. See 36 CONG. Q. 689, 690-92 (1978); 35 CONG. Q. 1346, 1347 (1977).
276. Wehr, Senate Approves Major Drug Law Revision, 37 CONG. Q. 2349 (1979).
277. Although the proposed S. 1075 would allow expedited premarket human testing, it would add to
existing requirements in other ways, e.g., mandatory package inserts of patient information, and added stan-
dards of "identity," .'stability" and "biovailability" for new drugs. Id.
278. See 35 CONG. Q. 1346 (1977); Buskhardt & Kienle, Controlled Clinical Trials and the Importance of
Medical Judgnent, in CONTROVERSIES IN CANCER 31 (Tagnon & Stagnet, eds., 1979).
279. Id.
280. J. BRONOWSKI, SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 79-81 (1956).
281. Moertel, A Trial of Laetrile Now, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 218, 219 (1978).
282. See text accompanying notes 79-106 supra.
283. Relman, Laetrilomania-Again, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 2!5 (1978).
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medical establishment may be stubbornly overlooking a valuable adjunct in
cancer therapy .... 284
E. Alternatives Less Drastic Than a Total Ban
The current total ban on Laetrile can also be attacked as ignoring less
drastic alternatives. The marijuana testing laws being adopted by a number of
states,8 5 in cooperation with federal agencies, provide a possible model:
making a substance available to patients and physicians who are screened by
a board of experts, and keeping track of the results as part of a scientific
study. The state interest in regulating unproven drugs is still well served,
desperate patients have a chance to elect an unapproved drug, and what is
effectively a huge, uncontrolled, unscientific mass of underground nonclinical
trials is brought into the light of scientific scrutiny. The patients no longer
have to leave the mainstream of professional medical care and take their
chances with untrained amateurs and drugs of uncertain strength and purity.
Instead they would benefit from the supervision of trained physicians, and the
drug, being channeled through a government agency capable of inspecting its
potency and purity, would be safer.
This does not necessarily open the door to the full-scale resumption of
cancer quackery. Removal of laws that totally ban unapproved cancer cures
would still leave on the books proscriptions against quackery. Physicians who
hold out false hope would remain subject to discipline by state medical
boards, and distributors of such drugs as Laetrile would be subject to prose-
cution if they advertised the unproven drugs as being in fact effective. Finally,
as two FDA officials have pointed out, the threat of medical malpractice may
have more of a chilling effect on unscrupulous physicians than the existence
of criminal sanctions.286
F. The Total Cancer Regulatory Scheme
It is possible that, when the Supreme Court finally addresses the applica-
tion of the privacy doctrine to personal medical decisions, it will decline to
include such decisions within the doctrine. This will presumably subject the
government's Laetrile ban to the relaxed rational basis test-usually a
guarantee of approval. It can be argued, however, that examining the federal
government's cancer scheme in toto might result in its failing even the rational
basis test.
In contrast to the government's total ban on unproven cancer remedies is
its permissive attitude toward the distribution of proven cancer causes. The
most glaring example is tobacco. It has been sixteen years since the landmark
report by the U.S. Surgeon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and
284. Id.
285. American Med. & News, Jan. 26, 1979, at 17-18.
286. Nightingale & Arnold, How Laetrile Laws Affect MDs, LEG. ASPECTS MED. PRACTICE Oct. 1978, at
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Health,2 7 which documented the connection between cigarette smoking and
lung cancer and heart disease. 28 As the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals stated four years later, "The danger cigarette smoking may pose to
health is, among others, a danger to life itself., 289 One writer says, "Cigarette
smoking is, without question, the greatest single public health problem this
nation has ever faced. ' ' 290 Yet cigarettes can still be purchased and consumed
legally. They are subject to increasing government regulation, of course; but
rather than ban a substance of proven carcinogenic quality, the government
has chosen instead to honor the sovereignty of individual choice.29' This it
does by trying to inform and convince the public not to smoke, or to smoke
less.292 Rather than force manufacturers to reformulate their tobaccos and
filters, the government has chosen to publicize each brand's content of the
suspected carcinogens.293 In effect, an American who smokes cigarettes is
doing so under an informed consent theory. In the name of individual free-
dom, since the hazard of smoking relates mainly to each individual consumer,
each person is warned of the consequences of his decision to smoke, and the
choice is his.294
If the smoker is unfortunate enough to contract cancer, however, his
individual freedom of choice terminates. He is free to select treatment only
from the state-sanctioned alternatives. If he is distressed by their low cure
rate and painful side-effects, he is not free to seek out alternatives, even on an
informed consent basis. He is thus free to choose the risk of contracting
cancer but not free to choose risky alternative treatments. Since cancer is
such a dangerous disease, more often fatal than not, the choice to contract it
would seem to be the crucial one. The government cancer scheme is even
more irrational: not only is tobacco not banned, but its production is
encouraged by price supports and export subsidies. 295
A government ban on tobacco would almost certainly result in its illegal
trade; and that forms a practical reason against such a ban.296 The same
reasoning applies to a proscribed drug such as Laetrile, which so many con-
sumers want. Its ban has not diminished demand; it has merely created a huge
underground traffic that has made it more expensive and more dangerous.
Users are criminalized and shunted out of the mainstream of proper medical
care.
297
287. U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORTOFTHE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TO THE SURGEON GENERAL (1964).
288. Id. at 33.
289. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
290. K. FRIEDMAN, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE SMOKING-HEALTH CONTROVERSY xi (1975).
291. Id. at 147.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, SMOKING AND HEALTH: REPORT OFTHE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
TO THE SURGEON GENERAL (1964).
295. K. FRIEDMAN, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE SMOKING-HEALTH CONTROVERSY 157 (1975).
296. Id. at 148-49.
297. Relman, Laetrilomania-Again, 298 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 215, 216 (1978).
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G. Laetrile May Work on Faith Only
The Laetrile controversy has centered on its effectiveness. Proponents
claim that it works; detractors insist it does not. There is a third possibility
that should be injected into policy considerations on whether the privacy
doctrine should include personal medical decisions to undertake unconven-
tional treatments. This is the possibility that Laetrile, while not clinically
effective, performs a placebo cure in patients who believe in it.298 The power
of faith in healing has had a medical following: "Respectable names in the
history of medicine, like Paracelsus, Holmes, and Osler, have suggested that
the history of medication is far more the history of the placebo effect than of
intrinsically valuable and relevant drugs. ' , 299 It is possible that if Laetrile
works, it does not do so in a fashion that can be clinically tested. It may work
because patients believe that it does. As one physician put it, "Placebos can
have profound effects on organic illness, including incurable malignan-
cies. ,300 It is possible, then, that requiring evidence of clinical efficacy may
deny cancer patients an effective drug-effective in a way that is just as real3 '
as that of an active pharmacalogical agent.
CONCLUSION
The right of privacy should extend to the intimate decisions involving
choice of treatment for a dangerous disease. The extension need not be
absolute. Instead, it can be balanced against countervailing government
interests. This is in line with previous privacy doctrine decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
The Court has avoided addressing the privacy doctrine in the context of
Laetrile or other unconventional medical treatments. Individuals are free to
contract cancer by ingesting cancer-causing substances. They are not free to
choose their treatments. Even in the absence of a definitive ruling on whether
such decisions should be protected by a fundamental right of privacy, the
cancer regulatory scheme does not withstand even the relaxed rational basis
test.
Until definitive clinical tests are authorized, no one will know whether
Laetrile works. Tens of thousands of cancer patients will continue using it
illegally, subject to added dangers of uninspected, unregulated drugs and
treatment. Their faith continues to be heightened by government refusal to
give Laetrile its day in the lab. Their faith may be the one ingredient of
Laetrile that does work.
Jon Christensen
298. The FDA has hinted at that possibility. See 42 Fed. Reg. 39,768, 39.799 (1977).
299. N. COUSINS, ANATOMY OF AN ILLNESS 45 (1979).
300. Id. at 51 (emphasis added), quoting Shapiro, 18 AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 73, 88 (1961).
301. Id. at 56-58.
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